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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a trade secret case filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey by BP 
Chemicals Ltd. (BP), a British corporation, against Formosa 
Chemical & Fibre Corporation (FCFC), a Taiwanese 
corporation, and Joseph Oat Corporation (JOC), a 
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of 
business in New Jersey. BP asserts claims underS 44(b) 
and (h) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1126(b) and (h), 
Articles 2 and 10 bis of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (hereinafter "the Paris 
Convention"), and New Jersey common law. BP alleges that 
FCFC misappropriated trade secrets relating to its 
methanol carbonylation process for making acetic acid by 
copying elements of an acetic acid plant design that BP's 
predecessor, Monsanto, had provided in 1980 to a licensee, 
China Petrochemical Development Corporation (CPDC). BP 
further alleges that FCFC and JOC entered into a contract 
whereby JOC would fabricate in New Jersey a number of 
chemical process vessels and heat exchangers using 
misappropriated technical specifications for ultimate use in 
the construction of an acetic acid plant in Taiwan. BP 
sought a preliminary injunction preventing JOC and FCFC 
from exporting these vessels to Taiwan. BP's amended 
complaint made clear that it sought to enjoin FCFC not 
only from taking possession of the JOC equipment, but 
from taking possession of any equipment manufactured in 
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the United States by U.S. companies using BP's trade 
secrets. BP also sought compensatory and punitive 
damages from FCFC. 
 
FCFC moved to dismiss the claim against it for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. The District Court deferred ruling on 
the motion until the conclusion of the five-month 
preliminary injunction hearing. The Court ultimately denied 
FCFC's motion to dismiss and ruled that BP had 
demonstrated its entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief 
against FCFC and JOC. The injunction entered pertained 
only to the JOC equipment. Following further submissions 
of the parties, the District Court established the length and 
terms of the injunction, limiting the duration to thirty 
months, beginning April 20, 1998, and ending October 20, 
2000. FCFC and JOC filed timely notices of appeal. BP filed 
a timely cross-appeal. 
 
The undisputed facts are as follows. FCFC is a publicly- 
traded Taiwanese corporation with its principal place of 
business in Taipei, Taiwan. FCFC is a subsidiary of a 
Taiwanese conglomerate known as the Formosa Plastics 
Group (FPG), which is owned by Y.C. Wang. In 1996, FPG's 
U.S. operations produced revenue of $2.58 billion. FCFC 
has a 3.51% stock interest in Formosa Plastics 
Corporations (FPC), a Delaware corporation with 
headquarters in New Jersey. In developing the design for its 
acetic acid plant, FCFC used "ASPEN" software that it 
leased from Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, another affiliate of 
FPG. 
 
FCFC has a contract with JOC under which JOC will 
fabricate vessels in New Jersey for delivery to FCFC in 
Taiwan. It is performance of this contract that the instant 
action seeks to enjoin. Correspondence by fax or otherwise 
between FCFC and JOC regarding this contract has 
occurred "at least once a week" over a period of a number 
of months. (A. 19597-600.) 
 
FCFC has contracts for the purchase of equipment for its 
acetic acid plant with at least eight U.S. vendors in addition 
to JOC. These vendors received "bid packages" containing 
specifications that allegedly incorporate misappropriated 
trade secrets. The process for soliciting bids was that 
 
                                4 
  
FCFC's engineering team would prepare a bid package and 
send it to a purchasing group. BP asserts, and FCFC does 
not dispute, that the purchasing group was actually the 
purchasing group of FPG, not FCFC. The purchasing group 
would then send the bid packages to the Taiwanese agents 
of U.S. vendors, who would in turn send them to their U.S. 
clients. All meetings between FCFC representatives and 
representatives of equipment vendors and their agents took 
place in Taiwan. No FCFC personnel visited the United 
States for any purpose in connection with the design or 
construction of the acetic acid plant. There is no evidence 
that any U.S. vendor received bid packages directly from 
FCFC, or even from FPG's purchasing group, rather than 
through Taiwanese agents of the U.S. vendors. 
 
FCFC's contract with Nooter, one of the U.S. equipment 
vendors, contains a provision requiring arbitration in New 
York of any disputes concerning that contract. The 
contracts with the other vendors call for arbitration in 
Taiwan. 
 
FCFC also has business contacts with the United States 
that are unrelated to its acetic acid plant project. In the 
past five years, FCFC entered into four contracts with U.S. 
companies for the purchase of chemical process technology, 
at least two of which involved the training of FCFC 
personnel in the United States. For example, FCFC has 
recently contracted with ABB Lummus Global, Inc., a New 
Jersey engineering firm. In performing this contract, 
Lummus is receiving daily faxes from FCFC in Taiwan. 
 
For more than a decade, FCFC has exported products 
(primarily rayon and fiber) to customers in the U.S. The 
parties agree that in 1996, these sales totaled about four 
million dollars. However, these sales were normally made in 
Taiwan through Taiwanese agents, and there is no evidence 
of direct sales by FCFC to purchasers in the United States. 
FCFC has no sales force, no representative offices, and no 
warehouses or other facilities in the U.S. There is no 
evidence that FCFC ever advertised its products in the U.S. 
 
FCFC argues on appeal that the District Court did not 
have personal jurisdiction over it. Both FCFC and JOC 
further argue that the District Court erred in issuing the 
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preliminary injunction by (1) determining the likelihood of 
success on the merits under the law of New Jersey rather 
than Taiwan, and (2) finding that the injunction was 
necessary to prevent imminent, irreparable harm. BP cross- 
appeals, asserting that the District Court erred in limiting 




The District Court found that "the nature and extent of 
[FCFC's] contacts with New Jersey and with the United 
States as a whole allow[ed it] to assert jurisdiction over 
FCFC under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)." (Dist. Ct. Op. at 10.) 
We hold that the District Court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over FCFC. 
 
Rule 4(k)(2) provides that: 
 
       [i]f the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the 
       Constitution and laws of the United States, serving a 
       summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, 
       with respect to claims arising under federal law, to 
       establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any 
       defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
       courts of general jurisdiction of any state. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(k)(2). 
 
       Rule 4(k)(2) thus sanctions personal jurisdiction over 
       foreign defendants for claims arising under federal law 
       when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the 
       nation as a whole to justify the imposition of United 
       States' law but without sufficient contacts to satisfy the 
       due process concerns of the long-arm statute of any 
       particular state. 
 
World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV YA Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 
717, 720 (5th Cir. 1996). FCFC argues that while the 
District Court correctly found that FCFC did not have 
sufficient contacts with New Jersey to justify assertion of 
jurisdiction under the State's long-arm statute, it 
incorrectly concluded (1) that BP's cause of action arose 
under federal law, and (2) that FCFC had sufficient 
contacts with the United States as a whole to justify 
assertion of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Because we 
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agree that the District Court erred in concluding that 
FCFC's contacts with the United States were sufficient to 
warrant the assertion of personal jurisdiction over it, we 
may assume, without deciding, that BP's claim arises under 
federal law.1 
 
Once FCFC moved to dismiss, BP had the burden of 
coming forth with competent evidence demonstrating that 
FCFC had sufficient contacts with the United States to 
justify the court's assertion of either specific or general 
personal jurisdiction. See Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 
Inc., 800 F.2d 53, 58 (3d Cir. 1998). Specific personal 
jurisdiction exists when the defendant has "purposefully 
directed his activities at residents of the forum and the 
litigation results from alleged injuries that `arise out of or 
related to' those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). General personal jurisdiction 
exists when the defendant's contacts with the forum, 
whether or not related to the litigation, are "continuous and 
systematic." Helicopteros Macionales de Columbia v. Hall, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Great Britain and the United States are signatories to the Paris 
Convention. BP characterizes its claim as arising under Articles 2 and 10 
bis of the Paris Convention and S 44 of the Lanham Act. Article 2 
provides that nationals of signatory countries "shall, as regards to the 
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the 
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may 
hereafter grant, to nationals." Paris Convention, Art. 2, I.E.L. IV-A. 
Article 10 bis provides that "[t]he countries of the Union are bound to 
assure to nationals of such countries effective protection against unfair 
competition." Id. Art. 10 bis. In L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, 
Inc., 
214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954), we found that S 44 subsections (b) and (h) 
were intended by Congress "to implement international agreements [like 
the Paris Convention] that are not self-executing" and "to fashion a 
remedy to coincide with rights growing from the . . . substantive 
provisions of [those] agreements." Id.  at 654. BP thus asserts that as a 
matter of federal law it is entitled to the same protection that New 
Jersey 
law affords to U.S. citizens. Its pleadings expressly disavow any right to 
relief based on conduct of FCFC in Taiwan so it claims no extraterritorial 
effect for the Lanham Act. Compare Van ity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton 
Co., 
234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1956). Given FCFC's limited contacts with 
the United States, we find it unnecessary to decide whether BP's claim 
against it arises under federal law and, if so, whether it states a claim 
against FCFC upon which relief could be granted. 
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466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). We examine in turn whether the 





FCFC's contacts with the United States do not give rise to 
specific jurisdiction. The constitutional touchstone of due 
process analysis is "whether the defendant purposefully 
established `minimum contacts' in the forum." Burger King 
Corp., 471 U.S. at 474. "[T]he foreseeability that is critical 
to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct 
and connection with the forum . . . are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 
U.S. 286, 295 (1980)). "It is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum . . . , thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws." Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958)). "This `purposeful availment' requirement 
ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a 
jurisdiction solely as a result of `random,'`fortuitous,' or 
`attenuated' contacts . . . ." Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
 
The Supreme Court has given several reasons why a 
forum may legitimately exercise jurisdiction over a 
nonresident who "purposefully directs" his activities toward 
forum residents. "A State generally has a `manifest interest' 
in providing its residents with a convenient forum for 
redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors." Id. at 
473 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776). "Moreover, where 
individuals `purposefully derive benefit' from their interstate 
activities, it may well be unfair to allow them to escape 
having to account in other States for consequences 
that arise proximately from such activities." Id. at 
473-74. Finally, "because `modern transportation and 
communications have made it much less burdensome for a 
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in 
economic activity,' it usually will not be unfair to subject 
him to the burdens of litigating in another forum for 
disputes relating to such activity." Id. at 474 (quoting 
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McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 
(1957)). 
 
"With respect to interstate contractual obligations, [the 
Supreme Court] ha[s] emphasized that parties who `reach 
out beyond one state and create continuing relationships 
and obligations with citizens of another state' are subject to 
regulation and sanctions in the other State for the 
consequences of their activities." Id. at 473 (quoting 
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 
(1950)). On the other hand, "[i]f the question is whether an 
individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can 
automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the 
other party's home forum, . . . the answer is clearly that it 
cannot." Id. at 478. The Supreme Court has endorsed "a 
`highly realistic' approach that recognizes that a `contract' is 
`ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior 
business negotiations with future consequences which 
themselves are the real object of the business transaction.' " 
Id. at 479 (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 
U.S. 313, 316 (1943)). "It is these factors--prior 
negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along 
with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual 
course of dealing--that must be evaluated in determining 
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum 
contacts within the forum." Id. 
 
"Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully 
established minimum contacts within the forum . . . , these 
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to 
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
would comport with `fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. 
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). "Thus courts 
`in appropriate case[s]' may evaluate `the burden on the 
defendant,' `the forum State's interest in adjudicating the 
dispute,' `the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief,' `the interstate judicial system's interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and 
the `shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantial social policies.' " Id. at 476-77 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). "These 
considerations sometimes serve to establish the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of 
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minimum contacts than would otherwise be required." Id. 
at 477. "On the other hand, where a defendant who 
purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents 
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling 
case that the presence of some other considerations would 
render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id."Nevertheless, 
minimum requirements inherent in the concept of`fair play 
and substantial justice' may defeat reasonableness of 
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged 
in forum activities." Id. at 477-78. 
 
Applying these principles in Burger King, the Supreme 
Court found jurisdiction proper where the defendant, 
"[e]schewing the option of operating an independent local 
enterprise, . . . deliberately `reach[ed] out beyond' [his home 
forum] and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the 
purchase of a long-term franchise and the manifold benefits 
that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide 
organization." Id. at 479-80. The Court emphasized that he 
entered "a 20-year relationship that envisioned continuing 
and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida," 
which relationship could be viewed as neither "random," 
"fortuitous," or "attentuated." Id.  Moreover, the Court stated 
that the Court of Appeals, in finding jurisdiction improper, 
"gave insufficient weight to provisions in the various 
franchise documents providing that all disputes would be 
governed by Florida law." Id. at 481. The Court reasoned 
that "[a]lthough such a provision standing alone would be 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction, . . . when combined with 
the 20-year interdependent relationship [the defendant] 
established with Burger King's Miami headquarters, it 
reinforced his deliberate affiliation with the forum State and 
the reasonable foreseeability of possible litigation there." Id. 
 
In this case FCFC's alleged misappropriation and 
improper use of BP's trade secrets have occurred and 
continue to occur in Taiwan. The primary alleged injury to 
BP has occurred and continues to occur in Great Britain. 
See Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 259-60 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (holding that in a trade secret case, the injury 
occurs to the owner of the trade secret wherever he 
resides). Thus, the primary tortious conduct giving rise to 
BP's claim against FCFC and to the injury caused thereby 
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is unrelated to the United States. The only FCFC contacts 
with the United States that are in any way related to BP's 
claim against it are that (1) it placed orders in Taiwan with 
eight United States based equipment suppliers to enable it 
to build the offending plant in Taiwan, (2) in furtherance of 
those orders it has sent correspondence from Taiwan into 
the United States, and (3) in one of those eight orders it 
agreed to arbitrate with that supplier in New York. Thus, in 
substance, this is a case where FCFC availed itself of the 
assistance of eight U.S. based companies who solicited its 
business in Taiwan in order to build a plant in Taiwan 
allegedly with resulting injury to BP in Great Britain. 
Accordingly, we find no act by which FCFC "purposefully 
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum . . . , thus invoking the benefits and protections 
of its laws." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. 
 
Burger King teaches that "a non-resident's contracting 
with a forum resident, without more, is insufficient to 
establish the requisite `minimum contacts.' " Sunbelt Corp. 
v. Noble, Dentor & Assoc., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1993). 
The same is true of "informational communications in 
furtherance of [such a] contract." Id.  at 32. Besides the 
contracts and implementing correspondence, there are no 
significant contacts here with the United States. The fact 
that these contracts were for a one-time purchase of 
equipment that was to be shipped to Taiwan and were 
solicited and negotiated through the Taiwanese agents of 
the U.S. vendors seems to us to negate any inference of 
"purposeful availment." 
 
In our view, FCFC's undertaking, in its contract with 
Nooter, to arbitrate in New York any disputes arising under 
the contract is the single fact that offers most substantial 
support for the proposition that the manner in which FCFC 
conducted its program of purchases of American equipment 
for its acetic acid plant reflected a measure of acquiescence 
in the possible need to submit to the jurisdiction of 
American courts, should disputes arise. But we think that 
this fact is not sufficient to carry the day. We of course 
recognize that, in the event of a dispute between FCFC and 
Nooter, the contractual agreement between FCFC and 
Nooter would probably -- and properly -- be regarded as a 
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waiver of objections to judicial jurisdiction as well, whether 
that jurisdiction was to be exercised by a New York state 
court or, in the alternative, by a federal court, located 
anywhere in the United States, with respect to a claim 
arising under federal law. But the dispute in the case at bar 
does not involve Nooter, and the FCFC-JOC contract 
contains no comparable venue-selection provision. More to 
the point, the provision in the FCFC-Nooter contract only 
involved venue selection. It was not a provision stipulating 
that New York law, or the law of any other American 
jurisdiction, would govern such disputes as might arise. 
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the provision 
constitutes purposeful availment of the benefits and 
protections of United States law. Given the attenuated 
connection between the arbitration clause and the instant 
litigation, it is insufficient to make the Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction comport with "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice." Cf. Kahn Lucas Lancaster v. Lark 
Int'l Ltd., 956 F. Supp. 1131, 1138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (New 
York arbitration clause is insufficient basis for jurisdiction 
over suit even between the parties to the contract 
containing the clause until the plaintiff indicates a desire to 
arbitrate the suit). 
 
Finally, we note that the United States has, at best, a 
very limited interest in adjudicating this dispute between 
two non-citizens, which is primarily a dispute regarding 
acts that took place in Taiwan that caused an injury in 
Great Britain. Although BP emphasizes that this suit seeks 
only to enjoin and recover damages for FCFC's actions in 
the United States, and not its acts of misappropriation in 
Taiwan, it cites no authority for the proposition that a 
plaintiff can strengthen the relationship between the 
defendant, the forum and the litigation by limiting the relief 
sought. Regardless of whether BP seeks relief for the 
actions of FCFC in Taiwan, the fact remains that FCFC has 
done nothing of substance other than contract in Taiwan 
with the Unites States based vendors to make one-time 
deliveries of equipment in Taiwan. Under Burger King, those 
purchases and the associated correspondence sent from 
Taiwan are insufficient to create specific personal 
jurisdiction. 
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We find substantial support for our holding in Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Maple Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th 
Cir. 1996). The plaintiff there brought a claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets in the Eastern District of 
Arkansas. As a basis for specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff 
pointed to the fact that the four machines incorporating the 
misappropriated trade secrets were purchased from a third- 
party Arkansas resident. See id. However, none of the 
defendant's employees went to Arkansas to negotiate their 
purchase or supervise their manufacture. See id.  The Court 
acknowledged that telephone calls between the defendant 
and the vendor, numbering at least one hundred,"can be 
evidence of a continuous and systematic business 
relationship," but it found that while these phone contacts 
"remain a consideration, they are insufficient, alone, to 




We conclude, as well, that FCFC's United States contacts 
are not such that an assertion of general personal 
jurisdiction comports with the demands of due process. As 
we have noted, even where the connection between a 
defendant's contacts and the litigation are insufficient to 
give rise to specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction will be 
available where the defendant's contacts unrelated to the 
litigation are "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). 
 
While FCFC exports its products to the United States, it 
is undisputed that it has no personnel or facilities here and 
there is no evidence that it has in any way advertised or 
solicited business here. As a result there is simply no basis 
for concluding that it has a continuous presence in the 
United States. 
 
Contrary to BP's suggestion, FCFC's relationship with 
FPG and its chairman, Mr. Wang, does not provide the 
requisite presence here. FCFC is a legally separate entity. 
The mere fact that FCFC had an arrangement with FPG, 
the details of which are not revealed in the record, whereby 
FCFC would submit bid packages to FPG's purchasing 
group, who would in turn submit them to other agents, and 
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the fact that FCFC leased software from Nan Ya, another 
FPG affiliate, is not a sufficient basis on which to pierce the 
corporate veil and assert jurisdiction over FCFC on the 
basis of the United States contacts of other FPG affiliates. 
See Cohn v. Insurance Co., 54 F.3d 1108, 1116 (3d Cir. 
1995) ("party seeking to pierce corporate veil must establish 
that controlling corporation wholly ignored separate status 
of controlled corporation and so dominated and controlled 
its affairs that separate existence is a mere sham"). 
Moreover, FCFC's passive ownership of 3.5% of the stock of 
a Delaware corporation cannot constitute the kind of 
continuous and systematic business contacts that give rise 
to general jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U.S. 186, 
213 (1977); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 
F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994). Finally, the fact that FCFC 
has entered into four other recent contracts for the 
purchase of chemical technology, two of which involved 
FCFC personnel traveling to the United States for training, 
is insufficient. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-17 (visits 
in connection with training and purchases, even if 
occurring at regular intervals, are insufficient basis for 
general jurisdiction). Even considering the cumulative effect 
of these various contacts together, the requirements for 




"In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving 
party must show (1) irreparable injury, (2) a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits, (3) the harm to it 
outweighs the possible harm to other interested parties, 
and (4) harm to the public." Frank Russell Co. v. Wellington 
Management Co., 154 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1998). A 
District Court then balances these four factors to determine 
if an injunction should issue. See id. JOC asserts that the 
District Court erred in finding that BP had demonstrated 
both imminent and irreparable injury and a likelihood of 




We find that the record supports the District Court's 
conclusion that an injunction was necessary to prevent 
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imminent and irreparable harm. The District Court did not 
clearly err in crediting BP's witness who testified as to the 
damage that would be done to BP's reputation, credibility 
and ability to license its technology if FCFC's plant became 
operational, giving rise to the public perception that BP was 
unable to protect its proprietary trade secrets. Such 
injuries to reputation are difficult to calculate, and thus 
money damages are an inadequate remedy. See Ferrero v. 
Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 
1991) (holding that injury to goodwill is irreparable). 
Moreover, although the evidence suggests that FCFC's plant 
would not have become operational for at least a year after 
the injunction was issued, the history of the instant 
proceedings belies JOC's unsupported assertion that a year 
was ample time to obtain a trial on the merits in Taiwan in 
the event that the equipment were allowed to leave this 
country. See Geritrex Corp. v. Dermarite Indus., LLC, 910 F. 
Supp. 955, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure S 2948.1, at 139 (2d ed. 1995) 
(explaining that imminence requires that the harm will 
occur before a trial on the merits can be had). The 
operation of FCFC's plant is not so remote in time as to be 
uncertain or speculative. See Continental Group, Inc. v. 
Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980). 
Finally, the District Court's finding that any delay on BP's 
part in filing suit "was caused by BP's conscientious 
decision to fully investigate the very serious charges before 
filing suit" is not clearly erroneous. BP Chems., Ltd. v. 
Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., No. 97-cv-4554, at 41 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 15, 1998). To the extent that delay can justify denial 
of a motion for a preliminary injunction, see, e.g., Citibank, 
N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985), "a delay 
caused by a plaintiff's good faith efforts to investigate an 
infringement" or to determine how serious an infringement 
is does not preclude a finding of irreparable harm. Tom 
Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc. , 60 F.3d 




In determining whether BP had shown a likelihood of 
success, however, the District Court concluded that New 
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Jersey had the most significant relationship with the case 
and applied New Jersey law in analyzing each issue. We 
conclude that it erred in doing so.2 
 
BP bases its claim against JOC on the following 
Restatement rule to which it maintains the New Jersey 
courts are committed: 
 
       One who discloses or uses another's trade secret 
       without a privilege to do so is liable to the other if . . . 
       (c) he learned the secret from a third person with 
       notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the 
       third person discovered it by improper means or that 
       the third person's disclosure was otherwise a breach of 
       duty to the other. 
 
Restatement (First) of Torts S 757 (1939); see also Williams 
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 164 & n.3 (3d Cir. 
1982) (holding that New Jersey has substantially adopted 
Restatement section 757(c)). 
 
JOC does not dispute, as we understand it, that New 
Jersey courts follow this rule.3 It stresses, however, that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. FCFC and JOC argued before us, under appropriate argument 
headings, that BP had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits 
and, under appropriate subheadings, that the record would not support 
a finding (1) that any information Tu gave FCFC was a trade secret, or 
(2) that Tu breached a duty by giving information to FCFC. Both briefs 
(see FCFC's opening brief at 50 and JOC's opening brief at 17-18) took 
the position that, contrary to the ruling of the District Court, both of 
these issues are governed by Taiwanese law. FCFC's brief cited authority 
in support of this position, and JOC expressly incorporated that 
authority. Having considered the conflicts of law issues thus raised, we 
have concluded that the District Court has entered an injunction, and is 
currently proceeding to the merits issues, based on an erroneous view of 
the law. Under these circumstances, we deem it appropriate and prudent 
to advise the District Court at this time regarding our view of the 
conflicts of law issues. 
 
3. It does dispute the application of the rule to the facts of this case, 
asserting that JOC did not have notice that FCFC had discovered the 
secret by improper means at the time it learned the secret from FCFC, 
and that therefore Restatement section 758 rather than section 757 
applies. Section 758 governs where the defendant does not have notice 
that the third party who disclosed the secret obtained it by improper 
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under New Jersey's flexible "governmental-interest analysis, 
. . . the determinative law is that of the state with the 
greatest interest in governing the particular issue to be 
decided." Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.J. 
1986) (emphasis supplied); accord O'Connor v. Busch 
Gardens, 605 A.2d 773, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1992) ("[C]hoice of law decisions can and should be made 
on an issue-by-issue basis, and thus the law of different 
states can apply to different issues in the same case.); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of LawsS 145, S145 
cmt. d. JOC points out that in addition to issues regarding 
its knowledge and conduct, the likelihood of BP's success 
on its claim depends on whether it can establish (1) that it 
had a protectable interest in its proprietary information -- 
i.e., a "trade secret" (and, in particular, that Monsanto and 
CPDC took the requisite security measures to protect the 
methanol carbonylation technology) and (2) that FCFC 
tortiously acquired BP's trade secret (and, in particular, 
that FCFC's consultant, Mr. Tu, owed a duty of 
confidentiality with respect to the technology and that 
FCFC had knowledge of a breach of duty in receiving and 
using BP's technology). Thus, while it appears to be 
undisputed that New Jersey law governs the issues of 
JOC's knowledge and conduct, this does not necessarily 
signify that New Jersey law -- as opposed to Taiwanese law 
-- applies to the two additional issues necessary to BP's 
case against JOC. 
 
JOC has tendered affidavits tending to show that 
Taiwanese law governing the protectability of commercially 
valuable information and what constitutes a tortious 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
means until after the defendant learns the secret. See Restatement (First) 
of Torts S 758 & cmt. a. Section 758 protects from liability an innocent 
third party who learns of the secret if prior to receiving notice "he has 
so 
changed his position that to subject him to liability would be 
inequitable." Id. S 758(b). JOC argues that its substantial investment of 
time and money in the manufacturing process thus precludes liability. 
The events from which the District Court inferred notice, however, all 
occurred prior to JOC's entering into its contract with FCFC. Thus, 
sections 757 and 758 do not differ in any respect that is relevant to the 
issue before us in this appeal. 
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conversion of such a protectable interest is different from, 
and more difficult for BP than, the New Jersey law 
governing those issues. As to the issue of protectability, the 
affidavits indicate, for example, that "[a] single unprotected 
disclosure [by either BP, Monsanto, CPDC or other 
Monsanto licensees] of the secret terminates its trade secret 
status immediately (like a needle hits a balloon)," (A. 6024), 
and that "BP is required to show that CPDC  actually took 
steps to safeguard the information," (A. 1046 (emphasis 
added)). As to the issue of whether FCFC tortiously 
acquired the information from Tu, the affidavits indicate 
that: 
 
       BP is required to show that CPDC actually entered into 
       a confidentiality agreement with Mr. Tu. There must be 
       evidence that Mr. Tu was put on notice or instructed 
       as to what materials he should consider confidential. 
       Under Taiwanese law, corporate obligations do not 
       attach to a corporation's employee. The employee has 
       to be subject to [sic] specific agreement or clear 
       instructions as to exactly what he was required to keep 




We recognize that BP has tendered conflicting affidavits 
tending to show that JOC's affidavits do not accurately 
characterize Taiwanese law and that Taiwanese and New 
Jersey law are the same as to these issues. It is enough for 
present purposes, however, to find that there is record 
evidence that, if believed, would support a finding that 
there are relevant differences in the laws of the two 
sovereigns that the parties claim to be governing. This 
requires us to determine whether Taiwan or New Jersey has 
the more substantial interest in determining: 
 
       (1) whether proprietary information licensed by its 
       purported owner for use in Taiwan was protectable and 
       whether at the time of its alleged conversion in Taiwan 
       it had been returned to the public domain; and 
 
       (2) whether FCFC's acquisition of the alleged trade 
       secret in Taiwan was wrongful. 
 
In both instances, we conclude based on the current record 
that Taiwan had the more substantial interest in having its 
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law applied and that a New Jersey court would apply that 
law in a case like this. 
 
We believe Taiwan has the greater interest in setting the 
standards regarding whether information that has been 
licensed by a British company to a Taiwanese company has 
been sufficiently safeguarded to warrant legal protection or 
whether it has entered the Taiwanese public domain. This 
issue implicates policy judgments regarding the appropriate 
balance between protecting trade secrets, thereby 
encouraging both the development of new technology and 
the willingness of foreign companies to share their 
technology with Taiwanese businesses, and free 
interchange and access to information, which also has 
profound implications for the health of the Taiwanese 
economy. New Jersey's interest, on the other hand, would 
appear to be virtually nil. As we have previously pointed 
out, BP, the purported owner of the trade secret, is not a 
resident of New Jersey and, while it may suffer some 
marginal injury there, New Jersey is assuredly not the 
principal situs of either the direct or the indirect injury 
inflicted.4 Moreover, we are doubtful that a New Jersey 
court would apply New Jersey law even if BP were a New 
Jersey corporation. A state's interest in protecting its 
citizens from injury by protecting intellectual property 
which they choose to license to foreign companies cannot 
outweigh the interests of the foreign sovereign in setting the 
standards for the protection of intellectual property within 
its own borders. Cf. O'Connor, 605 A.2d at 775. 
 
The New Jersey Superior Court's decision in O'Connor is 
instructive. There, a New Jersey resident was injured in 
Virginia. The injuries were allegedly caused by both the 
New Jersey plaintiff's and the Virginia defendant's 
negligence. The issue was whether the court should apply 
Virginia's strict rule of common-law contributory negligence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As we have previously pointed out, Great Britain, where BP is 
domiciled, is the principal situs of the injury alleged by BP. However, as 
we point out below, conventional choice of law doctrine ordinarily does 
not give great weight to the place of injury in cases, like the case at 
bar, 
arising out of claims of misappropriation of trade values. In any event, 
no party has suggested that British law governs any of the issues 
presented in this case. 
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or New Jersey's comparative negligence rule, which afforded 
more protection to the injured plaintiff. The court held that: 
 
       New Jersey's concern for its injured citizens is also 
       legitimate, but it cannot exempt them from other 
       states' law setting standards for local conditions and 
       conduct. If New Jersey's comparative negligence 
       doctrine followed [the plaintiff] [i]nto. . . Virginia, it 
       would follow her into every other state as well, and 
       would supplant local liability rules wherever she went. 
       That would be an impermissible intrusion into the 
       affairs of other states. 
 
Id.; cf. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States SS 402, 403 (1987) (discussing bases of 
and limitations on the jurisdiction to prescribe law with 
respect to a person or activity having connections with 
other states). Similarly, in this case, neither New Jersey nor 
Great Britain's concern for their injured citizens can 
outweigh Taiwan's interest in setting standards for the 
protection of intellectual property in Taiwan. 
 
Similarly, Taiwan has the greater interest in having its 
law applied to determine whether FCFC, a Taiwanese 
company, acted tortiously in acquiring information in 
Taiwan from CPDC, another Taiwanese company, and, in 
particular, as to the circumstances under which a 
Taiwanese company's actions have created a duty of 
confidentiality in its employees. Again the law in this area 
reflects a delicate balance of competing interests that has 
the capacity to profoundly affect the Taiwanese economy, 
and any interest that New Jersey would have in protecting 
trade secret holders who export their intellectual property 
to Taiwan is greatly outweighed by Taiwan's interest in 
setting the standards that govern the conduct of its own 
citizens regarding intellectual property that is present 
within its borders. 
 
The conclusion that Taiwan's interest in both of these 
issues is greater than New Jersey's finds further support in 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws , to which New 
Jersey courts have often looked for guidance. See, e.g., 
Veazey, 510 A.2d at 251; Rose, 293 A.2d at 367-77; 
O'Connor, 605 A.2d at 774. The Restatement  suggests that 
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the following factors should be taken into account in 
determining which state has the most significant 
relationship with a particular issue in tort law: 
 
       (a) the place where the injury occurred, 
 
       (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury 
       occurred, 
 
       (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
       incorporation and place of business of the parties, and 
 
       (d) the place where the relationship, if any, betw een 
       the parties is centered. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts S 145 (1971). 
 
"[T]he place where the conduct occurred is given 
particular weight in the case of torts involving . .. unfair 
competition." Id. S 145, cmt. (e), at 420. Moreover, while the 
general rule is that in determining whether an interest is 
entitled to legal protection, "the applicable law will usually 
be the local law of the state where the injury occurred," id. 
S 158 (emphasis added), the Restatement qualifies this rule, 
stating: 
 
       "[s]ituations do arise, however, where the place of 
       injury will not play an important role in the selection of 
       the state of applicable law. . . . This will . . . be so 
       when . . . there may be little reason in logic or 
       persuasiveness to say that one state rather than 
       another is the place of injury, or when, such as in the 
       case of multistate defamation, injury has occurred in 
       two or more states. 
 
Id. The Restatement further states that"the place of injury 
is less significant in the case of . . . such unfair competition 
as consists of false advertising and the misappropriation of 
trade values." Id. S145 cmt f. The Restatement's 
explanation for the unimportance of the place of injury in 
cases of misappropriation of trade values is directly 
applicable here: 
 
       The injury suffered through false advertising is the loss 
       of customers or of trade. Such customers or trade will 
       frequently be lost in two or more states. The effect of 
       the loss, which is pecuniary in its nature, will normally 
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       be felt most severely at the plaintiff's headquarters or 
       principal place of business. But this place may have 
       only a slight relationship to the defendant's activities 
       and to the plaintiff's loss of customers or trade. 
       The situation is essentially the same when 
       misappropriation of the plaintiff's trade values is 
       involved, except that the plaintiff may have suffered no 
       pecuniary loss but the defendant rather may have 
       obtained an unfair profit. 
 
Id. Equally applicable here is the conclusion that in such 
cases, "the place of injury does not play so important a role 
for choice-of-law purposes . . . as in the case of other kinds 
of torts[ and that i]nstead, the principal location of the 
defendant's conduct is the contact that will usually be given 
the greatest weight in determining the state whose local law 
determines the rights and liabilities that arise." Id. 
 
The vast majority of the conduct that is relevant to these 
two issues occurred in Taiwan.5 BP licenced the trade 
secrets to CPDC in Taiwan. To the extent that BP and 
CPDC took measures to safeguard those secrets in CPDC's 
hands, those measures were taken in Taiwan. FCFC 
acquired whatever information it acquired in Taiwan, 
designed its plant in Taiwan, prepared the bid packages 
with the specifications for the equipment in Taiwan, and 
delivered those packages to Taiwanese agents of U.S. 
companies in Taiwan. 
 
Moreover, while neither BP nor JOC is Taiwanese, which 
by itself weighs against the application of Taiwanese law, 
both have established significant relationships with Taiwan, 
BP by licensing its technology to a Taiwanese company and 
JOC by maintaining agents in Taiwan for the purpose of 
soliciting Taiwanese business. These relationships are 
centered in Taiwan, and these relationships gave rise to the 
events that are at issue here. 
 
We hold that Taiwan has the greater interest in having its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although BP has alleged misconduct occurring in New Jersey, namely 
JOC's fabrication of equipment using misappropriated technical 
specifications, this conduct has no relevance to either of the issues 
regarding which JOC asserts that Taiwanese law applies. 
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law govern the issues of whether BP had a protectable 
interest in the information licensed to CPDC and whether 
FCFC acted unlawfully in acquiring it. Therefore, to the 
extent that there is a conflict of law on these issues, 
Taiwanese law should govern. 
 
As we have previously noted, there is evidence in the 
current record that, if believed, would support a conclusion 
that Taiwanese and New Jersey law do not differ in any 
respect material here. The District Court had no occasion to 
resolve the conflict presented in the affidavits before it 
because it erroneously concluded that New Jersey law 
governed all issues. While we conclude that we are 
authorized to resolve that conflict, see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
44.1 (the content of foreign law is an "issue of law"); 
Franzen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 33 A.2d 599, 602 
(N.J. 1943) (same), we believe the District Court is in the 
best position to determine what at this point is essentially 
a credibility issue -- i.e., which expert to believe. The 
District Court will thus be required to determine hereafter 
whether Taiwanese law differs from that of New Jersey. It 
may address this issue in the context of a renewed 
application for a preliminary injunction and/or in the 
context of a merits determination. In either context, it will 
have discretion to supplement the existing record with 
testimony or otherwise and/or to conduct its own 
independent investigation regarding Taiwanese law. See 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 44.1; N.J. R. Evid. 201(a); Franzen, 33 




We will reverse the District Court's order of May 14, 
1999, and direct that it: (a) dismiss FCFC for want of 
personal jurisdiction, and (b) conduct further proceedings 
with respect to BP's claim against JOC in a manner 
consistent with this opinion.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we are setting aside the injunction entered by the District 
Court and remanding for further proceedings, we need not address the 
question, posed by BP's cross-appeal, whether the District Court erred in 
limiting the duration of the injunction to thirty months. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 
 
Except with respect to the comments below, writing 
separately in this case would not serve a useful purpose. I 
do not join part IIIB of the opinion of the Court. Both FCFC 
and JOC merely mentioned the choice-of-law issue in 
passing in their briefs. See FCFC Br. At 41, 50 n.7; JOC Br. 
At 17. " `[A] passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice 
to bring that issue before this Court.' " Laborers' Int'l Union 
of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citation omitted) (ellipsis in original). I would hold 
that no choice-of-law issue is properly before the Court in 
this appeal. Without full briefing from the parties, I am 
unwilling to join the Court's novel application of New Jersey 
choice-of-law principles. 
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